We study a dynamical model of a population of cooperators and defectors whose actions have long-term consequences on environmental "commons" -what we term the "resource". Cooperators contribute to restoring the resource whereas defectors degrade it. The population dynamics evolve according to a replicator equation coupled with an environmental state. Our goal is to identify methods of influencing the population with the objective of maximizing accumulation of the resource. In particular, we consider strategies that modify individual-level incentives. We then extend the model to include a public opinion state that imperfectly tracks the true environmental state, and study strategies that influence opinion. We formulate optimal control problems and solve them using numerical techniques to characterize locally optimal control policies for three problem formulations: 1) control of incentives, and control of opinions through 2) propaganda-like strategies and 3) awareness campaigns. We show numerically that the resulting controllers in all formulations achieve the objective, albeit with an unintended consequence. The resulting dynamics include cycles between low and high resource states -a regime termed an "oscillating tragedy of the commons". This outcome may have desirable average properties, but includes risks to resource depletion. Our findings suggest the need for new approaches to controlling population-environment dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
A tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals in a population are driven by selfish interests, resulting in the depletion of a common resource on which they all depend. The interactions that drive such tragedies are modeled in classical game theory as a prisoner's dilemma [1] , [2] . The rational choice is to defect, regardless of what others are doing. However, classical models do not account for the consequences of action. Actions affect the environment. The state of the environment may shape incentives for future action. Dynamical models of these coevolutionary features have been developed to understand general conditions under which tragedies will occur or be averted [3] , [4] , [5] . Similarly, the study of common-pool resource games suggest that rational play among larger populations leads to resource collapse with higher probability [6] , [7] .
In [8] , Hardin argues that such tragedies are inevitable given a growing human population, unless preventative measures are taken. To address the problem of preventing tragedies, there has been speculation about what intervention strategies will be effective. Interventions from centralized government entities are called for, through implementing and enforcing new policies restricting overconsumption [2] , [9] . For example, imposing taxes on resource usage may provide a financial deterrent to overuse [10] . Passing regulatory laws on fishers gives fish populations a chance to recover [11] . Such direct intervention policies provide the incentives necessary to instigate conservation behaviors [12] .
Information also plays an important role. Individuals may not take pro-environmental actions if they are not informed about why such actions are necessary [13] . Environmental awareness and education can lead to behavior changes when individuals realize that environmental degradation has adverse effects on their own community. For example, information from household metering about water scarcity improved efforts to conserve water [14] . However, statistics and facts may be ineffective to instigate behavior changes if such issues are politicized [15] . In these situations, public opinion is susceptible to propaganda from news outlets and social media. Environmental information is necessary to affect behavior change, but may not be sufficient [16] , [12] , [13] . The efficacy of these proposed solutions are rarely tested using dynamical models that couple actions and environmental changes [2] .
A taxation mechanism on resource investment was studied in the setting of a common-pool resource game where under certain conditions, higher tax rates can lead to lower probability of resource collapse [10] . However, asymptotic outcomes are not considered in this static one-shot game. In a recent work [17] , an infinite horizon optimal control framework was applied to a dynamical model 1 to identify conditions under which an optimal prescribed consumption rate ensures resource sustainability. However, the consumption rate is not directly manipulated by taxing, pricing, or other social control policies.
In contrast, we consider in this paper such direct control policies. We formulate optimal control problems that study the role of incentive and information-based intervention with the objective of maximally conserving the environmental state over a finite horizon. We apply these control formulations to the model of ref. [3] , due to its general framework modelling a population of myopic individuals whose actions affect and are affected by the environment. This framework differs from that of differential games [18] , where individuals select strategies to maximize long-term payoffs given actiondependent dynamic environments. We formulate an incentive control problem where an external entity influences the population's incentive to cooperate together. We also implement information-based control policies by modelling a public opinion that imperfectly tracks the true environmental state. We present two formulations in which the control affects public opinion: propaganda strategies that perturb public opinion, and awareness-raising strategies where learning of the true environmental state is encouraged. In all three formulations, we compute optimal controls by numerical means (by "optimal" in this paper, we mean locally optimal since the problems we formulate are nonconvex).
The main contributions and findings of this paper are 1) the formulation of optimal control problems to address the tragedy of the commons through direct policy interventions and 2) the solutions of these problems, obtained by numerical techniques, result in highly oscillatory behavior. In particular, we show through simulations that the objectives of the formulated problems are achieved, at the expense of inducing highly variant dynamics characterized by oscillatory cycles between low and high resource states. An extended version of this paper is available online [19] , which contains proofs and an appendix outlining the optimal control algorithm.
II. MODEL A. Feedback-evolving games
Here, we review the model of [3] , which incorporates environmental feedback into replicator dynamics of a 2 × 2 game, where the strategies are cooperate (C) and defect (D). This model is intended to provide a general framework in which to portray the dynamics of tragedy of the commons scenarios. It incorporates an environment state n(t) ∈ [0, 1] where n = 0 (n = 1) means the environment is completely depleted (replenished). We will use the terms environment and common resources interchangeably to refer to n. The game payoffs are determined by n as follows.
(1) When n = 1, agents play a game determined by the payoff matrix A 1 , given by the first matrix of the right-hand side above. Similarly, when n = 0, the game is determined by the second matrix above, A 0 . In the game with payoffs A 1 , we impose that defection is the dominant strategy, that is, R 1 < T 1 and S 1 < P 1 . Thus, players will always prefer to defect when resources are abundant. The only pure Nash equilibrium in this game is mutual defection, where players obtain a payoff P 1 . The structure of the game in the depleted state, given by the payoff matrix A 0 , is a free parameter to allow different asymptotic outcomes of the system. The frequency-dependent fitnesses are
where x ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction (frequency) of cooperators in the population, and 1 − x the fraction of defectors.
Cooperators, x Environment, n 0 0 1 The game-environment coupled dynamics obey the following differential equations.
is the difference in fitness between cooperators and defectors. The n(1 − n) term indicates a logistic growth of the environmental state, and serves to constrain the dynamics to n(t) ∈ [0, 1] ∀t ≥ 0. The growth or decline of the environment depends on the fraction x of cooperators in the population, who enhance n at a rate θ > 0 while defectors degrade n at a rate −1. In general, one may havė
We set = 1 so that x and n evolve on comparable time-scales. We denote the state vector y(t) ≡ [x(t), n(t)] and the system mapping of (3) as F :
There are four "corner" fixed points, (0,0), (1,0), (0,1), and (1,1). Trajectories that start on the boundaries of [0, 1] 2 stay there, i.e. each edge is forward-invariant. In the rest of this paper, we focus our attention on system dynamics in the interior of the forward-invariant state space (0, 1) 2 .
B. Summary of dynamics in feedback-evolving games
The behavior of the system (3) relies on the choice of the payoff parameters R 0 , S 0 , T 0 , and P 0 . There are seven possible dynamical regimes, and they are summarized and named in Figure 1 . The outcomes that are possible include a tragedy of the commons (TOC1 -TOC4), aversion of TOC (V1 and V2), and an "oscillating" TOC (OTOC). In V2, trajectories asymptotically approach an interior fixed point. In OTOC, trajectories approach an asymptotically stable heteroclinic cycle, defined by the counter-clockwise orientation of the corners and the edges connecting them (see SI of [3] for details). This dynamical outcome is termed an "oscillating tragedy of the commons" because it is characterized by cycles between replete and deplete environmental states.
III. INCENTIVE CONTROL POLICIES A. Optimal control formulation
We consider here strategic policies that influence individuals' incentives to cooperate together with the goal of conserving public resources over time. The control variable u(t) is applied to the payoff matrix (1) as follows.
A n (u(t)) = n R 1 S 1
(4) In this formulation, we will constrain u(t) ∈ [−u m , u m ] for all t, where u m > 0 is a positive constant. We formulate the following optimal control problem in Bolza form.
Recall that x and n are the state variables with u as the control. The term x 2 (1 − x)(1 − n) appears after re-deriving the replicator equation with the payoff (4) in the same manner as (2) with the payoff matrix A n (u). We omit the expression for the Hamiltonian H and co-state dynamics λ = [λ x , λ n , ] . The first-order optimality conditions required by Pontryagin's Maximum Principle (PMP) are given by the costate dynamical equationṡ
with λ(T f ) = [0, 0] and the maximizer of the Hamiltonian
where
is the switching function. In the case when ϕ(t) = 0, the Hamiltonian is independent of u, and hence u * can take an arbitrary value.
Note that x 2 (1−x)(1−n) > 0 for all t because of invariance of the interior. As long as ϕ(t) = 0 does not occur on an open interval in the time horizon [0, T f ], u * (t) is a bangbang controller (no singular arcs). Hence, u * (t) will only take two values -the minimum and maximum points in the constraint set [−u m , u m ]. Proposition 1. An optimal controller u * given by (7) is non-singular. That is, it switches between the two values {−u m , u m } at isolated points in the horizon interval [0, T f ].
Proof. The proof is outlined in [19] .
B. Numerical simulations
We use the optimal control algorithm featured in [20] . It is based on hill climbing with Armijo step sizes [21] . The direction it follows at each iteration is based on an explicit computation of the pointwise maximizer of the Hamiltonian function at time-points in a given finite grid. Hence, its effectiveness hinges on how easy it is to compute the maximizers. In the formulation (5), the state equation is affine in the control u and nonlinear in the state variable.
We applied the algorithm to the problem (5), where we fix [R 1 , S 1 , T 1 , P 1 ] = [3, 1, 6, 2], θ = 0.7, y 0 = [0.7, 0.3], T f = 100, u m = 1. The values in the payoff matrix A 0 are varied in order to survey different outcomes from distinct regimes (see Figure 1 ). Due to high nonlinearity of the state equation, a low error tolerance is required to produce accurate and numerically stable dynamics y(t), where we use relative and absolute tolerance values of 10 −8 .
In experiments from the four TOC regions, the resulting controllers were all unable to prevent the environment n(t) from depletion by the end of the time horizon. Of particular interest is the resulting controlled dynamics when A 0 (u) is confined within the V2 regime for all u ∈ [−1, 1], which we display in Figure 2 . With u 0 (t) = 0, the algorithm converges after 40 iterations to a controller that induces the states x(t) and n(t) to oscillate with greater amplitudes by applying the maximal negative incentive −1 near the peaks of n(t). It then quickly re-applies the maximum positive incentive +1. Motivated by this resonance-like behavior, we run the algorithm again with the state-dependent initial guess u 0 (t) = sgn(x − x c ), which switches between ±1 precisely at the points whereṅ(t) = 0, or x(t) = 1/(1 + θ).
The resulting controller deviates slightly from this initial guess, and outperforms the control from the first experiment (J = 25.6359 vs 29.9707). Also shown in Figure 2 are the iterates of the optimality function Θ(u k ), which is a measure of distance from optimality in the sense of PMP (see [20] for details), and is always non-positive.
IV. INFORMATION CONTROL POLICIES
In this section, we extend the dynamics (3) to incorporate a public opinion state o(t) ∈ [0, 1]. We interpret the state o(t) to be the average opinion in the population about the environment. The population responds to this belief. We then formulate and numerically solve two optimal control problems where influence is applied public opinion.
A. Model with public opinion
We introduce the following dynamics to model how opinions change in the population.
where γ > 0 and x 0 , n 0 , o 0 ∈ (0, 1). The form of theȯ equation induces o(t) to track the environmental state n(t). There is a lag between actual changes in the environment and the public becoming informed about the changes. The learning parameter γ > 0 determines how slow this lag is. Higher values of γ allow o(t) to more successfully track n(t). Theẋ equation above is modified from (3) by replacing the relative fitness g(x, n) with g(x, o). Here, individual incentives are now determined by the current public opinion and not the true environmental state n. Thus, the previous system dynamics (3) can be interpreted as the population responding to perfect information about the environment, o(t) = n(t) ∀t ≥ 0. We denote the system mapping (8) as A notable effect of the public opinion occurs in the V2 and OTOC regimes (Figure 3) , where the (x(t), n(t)) trajectories are pushed towards the boundary of the state space. This is due to the delay in opinion, and the intuition is as follows. When n(t) starts to increase towards a peak, o(t) lags behind and stays below n(t). This causes more of the population to become cooperators, since they are responding to a lower relative to the true resource state. As a result, n(t) is restored more than if the population had perfect information. Then, o(t) overestimates n(t) as it decreases, causing the population to defect, degrading the environment. This process repeats, causing growing oscillations.
B. Optimal control formulation: propaganda strategies
We consider an external entity, e.g. media platforms, politicians, and activists, that seeks to maximally conserve the environment by influencing the public's opinion. First, we study policies that perturb opinion by injecting information. Propaganda and media broadcasts can achieve such perturbations, for example. We formulate the problem
where C 1 , C 2 > 0 are the priority and regulator weights, respectively. The additive control term o(1 − o)u serves two purposes. First, it keeps the dynamics well-posed, i.e. a solution o(t) that starts in [0, 1] will stay in [0, 1]. Second, it models the difficulty to influence extreme opinions. The additive term decreases to zero as o approaches the extremes 0 and 1, and hence more influence is required to move o(t) away from the extremes. The control is left unconstrained,
The Hamiltonian is concave in u, and hence it admits the unique point-wise maximizer
We numerically solve the problem (9) . We fix the priority weight C 1 = 1, and study modifications to the regulator weight C 2 . We fix in the TOC1 regime for a limited time, followed by collapse, if effort cost was low (C 2 = .001). When the cost weights are balanced, e.g. C 2 = 1, we did not observe resurgence of the commons in any of the TOC regimes.
In regime V2, when control effort is balanced (C 2 = 1, Figure 4a ), the computed control applies effort at selected times during the horizon. Starting with a high negative amplitude, the control relaxes effort as o(t), n(t) begin to decrease around t = 15. It applies effort again as o(t), n(t) begin to increase around t ∈ [30, 40] . This causes the environment to oscillate between more extreme depleted and repleted states. In Figure 4b with C 2 = 0.001, control effort is cheap.
The resulting control applies a large negative impulse at the beginning to push o(t) very low. This stimulates the growth of cooperators and consequently, the environment, which stays near n = 1 until after t = T f . After the initial impulse, defectors come to eventually dominate. In the absence of control (after T f ), the dynamics are subject to oscillations (Fig. 3, top) . Similar results are obtained when applying the algorithm in the OTOC dynamical regime.
C. Environmental awareness strategies
We now consider strategic information policies that guide public opinion towards the true environmental state n(t).
Environmental awareness and educational campaigns are examples of interventions that serve this purpose. We formulate the following optimal control problem, where the control directly affects the learning parameter γ.
The pointwise maximizer of H under the non-negativity constraint on u(t) is
Numerical results in the V2 regime is shown in Figure  5a , where we set C 2 = 0.001, γ = 0.5, θ = 0.5, and [R 1 , S 1 , T 1 , P 1 ] = [3, 1, 6, 2] . Due to the lag γ, public opinion o(t) overestimates n(t) on the intervals where n(t) is decreasing, and underestimates when n(t) is increasing. The resulting awareness control is applied during these intervals to push opinion lower towards the true environmental state, and is not applied on intervals where n(t) is increasing. Consequently, the awareness policy promotes cooperative behavior in times where public opinion overestimates the true environmental state. The induced dynamics resemble an oscillating tragedy of the commons.
In Figure 5b , similar results hold for the controller in the OTOC regime. A single impulse of awareness control is applied around t = 7, when o(t) ≈ 0.16 greatly overestimates n(t) ≈ 0.03.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we studied incentive and opinion control policies that seek to maximally conserve the environmental state in a game-environment feedback model. We formulated these policies in the setting of optimal control problems, and solved them by using suitable numerical techniques. The incentive policies are bang-bang controllers that, counterintuitively, switch between maximal promotion and punishment of cooperative behaviors. The switching times occur near critical points of the environmental state dynamics. We then considered two methods of influencing public opinion about the environment. The first is a propaganda-like intervention where an external influencing agent attempts to sway public opinion. The second aims to raise public awareness of the current true environmental state. In simulations, both methods steer opinion lower, i.e. convincing the public that the environment is worse than it actually is.
We find in certain regimes that the controllers induce an oscillating tragedy of the commons, which maximizes accumulation of the resource because the policies increase the amount of time spent at high replete states. The major drawback is that repeated collapses of the resource are inevitable. This outcome is undesirable if there are no alternative resource options. Hence, alternative approaches to control are necessary. In summary, our simulation results offer intuition as well as caution regarding the use of control to tragedy of the commons scenarios. Hence, our study provides additional motivation for future work to develop a deeper theoretical basis for control problems in this application area.
